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Abstract
This paper deals with the globalisation process and with the ten-
sions between national, super-national and sub-national forces it en-
tails. A taxonomy is put forward in order to examine the ques-
tion at di¤erent levels, distinguishing aspects of ‘techno-territoriality’,
‘techno-sovereignty’, ‘techno-citizenship’ and ‘techno-nationality’, per-
taining to, respectively, geographical borders, governance structures
and policy making, strategic behaviors and accountability, socio-cultural
distances and spaces. The analysis of some of the massive contri-
butions on the issue shows that the …rst three items have actually
reached a global speci…cation, but without completely losing national
or even more local characters. A di¤erent evaluation instead holds
for techno-nationality, as a certain communality of language and cul-
ture within a country, along with its historically formed institutional
setting, conduce to di¤erent technological styles and performances:
‘techno-national systems of innovation’ therefore still matter.
1 Introduction
It is generally recognised that from the 1980s onwards international economic
integration has increased substantially, both at the intensive and at the ex-
tensive margin (Chesnais, 1992; Michie & Smith, 1995). On the intensive
side, trade ‡ows have expanded both in volume and in spread, and the same
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occurred at even higher rates for foreign direct investments. On the exten-
sive side, internationalization has been involving a larger number of economic
activities, as …rms started conceiving …nance, management, corporate strate-
gies and also innovation, besides production and marketing, on a world-wide
basis.
Although this new phase of internationalization is commonly referred
to as ‘globalization’, and identi…ed with quite generally accepted aspects
(OECD, 1992, Ch.10, p.211), the research on its actual extension and on its
e¤ects is far from conclusive. In particular, it is still unclear which is the
outcome of the entailed tension between national, local and global forces, an
argument that has been developed with di¤erent focuses, methodologies, and
conclusions1.
This is especially true in dealing with technology, as at least two ap-
proaches can be identi…ed. On the one hand, there is a ‘dualistic’ kind of
approach, which characterizes ‘techno-globalism’ and ‘techno-nationalism’ as
two contradictory and mutually exclusive patterns of technological change in
which nation (or more local) based factors are, respectively, either already
irrelevant or still crucial. The …elds in which this dichotomy is investigated
are numerous and heterogeneous, so that this approach is unable to reach
general conclusions about the prevalence of a global rather than of a national
or a local argument2. An alternative approach which looks more promising
in this last respect is a ‘complementary’ one, that aims to better qualify some
more speci…c moments and aspects in which techno-globalism might proceed
to a di¤erent extent and with a di¤erent speed3.
1Out of the numerous volumes on the subject, at least three recent are worthwhile
mentioning for their socio-economic breath: Berger & Dore (1996), Boyer & Drache (1996),
and Storper (1997).
2Some studies extend to R&D the standard ‘international business’ approach to multi-
national corporation (Pearce, 1989; Goshal & Bartlett, 1988; Bartlett & Goshal, 1990;
Howells & Wood, 1993), while some other apply to them a ‘technology oriented’ approach,
allocating their innovative outcomes between subsidiaries and parent companies (Patel &
Pavitt, 1991; Patel, 1995). Some contributions address nation-speci…c factors of globaliza-
tion, such as the …nal demand or the resource endowment (Porter, 1990; Cantwell, 1995;
Movery & Oxley, 1995), while some other highlight local territorial units, such as small-
medium-…rms and industrial districts (de la Mothe & Paquet, 1996; Storper, 1993). In
some cases the focus is technology-speci…c, and cross-country sectoral similarities are high-
lighted (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1995), while in some other it is on the historical, geographical
and social context that underpins cross-technology national similarities (Freeman, 1987,
1995; Nelson, 1993; Cohendet et al., 1992).
3The literature that follows this approach is not as much rich but still relevant. In
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Following this last approach, in this paper I suggest that the whole ques-
tion could bene…t from a further clari…cation attempt. A taxonomy is there-
fore proposed in which ‘techno-territoriality’, ‘techno-sovereignty’, ‘techno-
citizenship’, and ‘techno-nationality’ identify four distinct, although not in-
dependent, aspects, with di¤erent global, national and local speci…cations.
This scheme reveals particularly useful in organizing existing and further ev-
idence on the topic, as well as in testing the validity of nation-based notions
and theories of innovation.
In what follows I will …rst assign some results one can …nd in the relevant
literature to the proper heading of the taxonomy (Section 2), stressing their
‘pro-global’ or ‘pro-national’ character. I will then refer to the most debated
nation-based notion of the issue, that of ‘national systems of innovation’
(NSI), and I will try to show how techno-nationality is, out of the four, the
con…guration underpinned by its most articulated theoretical conceptualisa-
tion (Section 3). In the …nal section (Section 4) a general balance of the
di¤erent speci…cations established within each component of the taxonomy
is attempted.
2 Techno-statism versus techno-nationalism
As it is well known, in political sciences state and nation, two concepts that
in economics often go under the same heading of country, are clearly dis-
tinct. According to the so called ‘institutional theory of law’4, the state is
an institution identi…ed by three constituent elements: (i) territory, that is
a geographical space delimited by natural or arti…cial boundaries; (ii) sov-
ereignty, that is an original kind of power that makes the state independent
and superior to other minor legal institutions; (iii) citizens, meant as the
community of all those who acquired the relative status, rights and liabili-
ties in a recognised way (not only originally). The nation instead refers to
a social and ethnic entity, characterised by a certain communality of race,
language, culture, habits, traditions, and religion among its components.
some cases the internationalization process is broken down into phases (e.g. commercial,
hierarchical, and communicative) depending on the prevalent ‘integrators’ and ‘media’
(Grandinetti & Rullani, 1996, Ch.2). In some other techno-globalism is subdivided into
components, depending on the focus being on innovative production, distribution and
international collaboration (Archibugi & Michie, 1995; 1997).
4To this theory can be traced the positions of von Stein, von Gierke, Hauriou, Elrich
and Santi Romano, just to quote the most important.
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The relationship between the two concepts is quite strict, as the nation
pre-exists to the state and represents that sociological basis which guarantees
its permanence along the time. On the other hand, the nation does not simply
coincide with the citizens of one state, as several plurinational-states reveal5.
With the necessary ‡exibility of every eclectic exercise, the rational of
this general distinction can be extended to the speci…c domain of technolog-
ical change, so that ‘techno-statism’ and ‘techno-nationalism’ can be taken
to account for two di¤erent kinds of issues. Pursuing the parallel, techno-
statism is here used to indicate those techno-economic aspects which relate
to one of the three constituent elements of the state, that is: the relevance
of the geographical space within which innovations are produced and dif-
fused, and of the physical distance between innovative producers and users
(‘techno-territoriality’); the actual domain of di¤erent levels of public gover-
nance and the e¢cacy of the relative science and technology (S&T) policies
(‘techno-sovereignty’); the degree of accountability and loyalty of the main
innovative actors to more or less global centers of power, either public or pri-
vate (‘techno-citizenship’). Techno-nationality as such instead here refers to
the innovative role played by the existence of di¤erent socio-economic com-
munalities, identi…ed by language, culture and other more speci…c forms of
social sharing, along with the historical roots of their broader institutional
setting and social architectures.
Let us consider each of these aspects in turn.
2.1 Techno-territoriality
As the recent upsurge of interest of economists for geography reveals6, the
actual location of productive activities is extremely important. Although
the increasing role of ‘globalizing’ technologies (e.g. communication and in-
formation technologies) makes the incidence of transportation and commu-
nication costs less relevant than in the past, another kind of argument sets
the question of the physical distance between producers and users (not only
innovative) as a crucial one, that of the role of knowledge.
5The discussion is indeed very sketchy, but here it su¢ces to recall the nature of
the distinction. For a more detailed historical account of the concepts of nation and
of nationality see, for example, Mises (1919, Ch. I; Ed.1994).
6Just remind the path-breaking volume of Krugman (1991) and the more recent book
of Storper (1997).
4
In nowadays economic systems knowledge is by far the most relevant fac-
tor input (Loasby, 1998; Lundvall & Barras, 1998), the more when it is new
knowledge, that is innovation, to be produced and applied. Its inner na-
ture is therefore highly in‡uential in determining the actual speci…cation of
the relevant geographical boundaries: this holds in particular for the impor-
tant distinction between codi…ed (explicit, or formal) and tacit (implicit, or
informal) knowledge in the pursuit of science and technology7.
It is quite straightforward that physical proximity wouldn’t be relevant for
the implementation and di¤usion of any innovation, if it exclusively or mainly
relied on a formal kind of knowledge. As it can be easily de-contextualized,
codi…ed and transmitted, the geographical distance between innovative pro-
ducers and users, either actual or potential, wouldn’t enter the ‘feasibility
constraints’ of a certain innovation, while it could instead be relevant for
other kinds of reasons, such as, for example, distributive (the commercial-
ization of a new product) or organisational (the implementation of a new
productive process). In other words, if this was the case, techno-territoriality
would have a global speci…cation.
Although, as it will be clari…ed later, quite criticizable, this seems to
be the implicit perspective undertaken by some recent contributions of in-
ternational political economy and international relations8. These authors
maintain that …rms would currently be quite footloose and free of choosing
the technologies to implement or to adopt, as well as of selecting or rejecting
the appropriate organisational forms and the suitable locations9.
This global techno-territorial argument is mainly put forward in deal-
ing with multinational corporations (MNCs): as the most relevant informa-
tive ‡ows between a¢liates and parent companies are codi…ed, and what is
more in company-speci…c codes, it is claimed that MNCs would consist of
integrated structures, within which innovation might be possibly undertaken
7Brie‡y, the former refers to information and instructions that can be formulated in
words and symbols, while the latter refers to those which cannot be completely formulated
in an explicit way and are therefore embodied in physical or human capital. Among
the several references on the issue, see, for example, the suggestive account provided by
MacKenzie & Spinardi (1994) of the invention and di¤usion of the earliest nuclear weapons.
8See, for example, de la Mothe & Paquet, (1996), Ohmae (1990), and Strange (1988).
9Also the extreme idea of ‘virtual companies’ (and ‘virtual governments’), enlarging and
shrinking their …eld of action depending on the opportunity of joining and quitting alliances
or partnerships (Davidow & Malone, 1992; de la Mothe & Paquet, 1994), relies on the
assumption that …rms can be cabled within networks of context-independent information
‡ows.
5
everywhere, and actually localized on the basis of ‘extra-territorial’ considera-
tions. Although some empirical evidence seems to con…rm this interpretation,
suggesting that the subsidiary-parent company distribution of the innovative
activities and of the innovative results mainly responds to strategic questions
(Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990; Archibugi & Michie,
1995), a narrower characterisation for techno-territoriality can be claimed,
although indirectly, also in this ‘multinational’ context10. The argument is
quite simple and consists of recognizing how the actual innovative corporate
structure of a MNC might also be a¤ected by communicative transaction
costs, entailed by a relevant distance in geographical terms and in turn over-
come by …tting a proper organisational kind of distance (Lundvall, 1992b;
Kogut & Zander, 1993; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990).
The ‘local’ speci…cation of techno-territoriality however emerges more
clearly when the crucial role of tacit knowledge for the innovative process
is considered. Unlike explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge cannot be stored
or transferred exclusively by impersonal, and context-independent means,
such as written documents, or computer …les. As person-to-person contacts,
practical demonstrations, and physical transactions are instead necessary for
its transmission, the spatial dimension entailed by techno-territoriality is in-
evitably recovered.
According to the latter point, and to related theoretical arguments11,
techno-territoriality would therefore rather have a national, or sub-national
speci…cation. As for the national characterisation, some ‘environmental/systemic’
approaches to competitiveness (Hatzichronoglou, 1996) have shown how im-
portant virtuous circles can be set-up and fuelled by knowledge sharing and
e¤ective feed-backing when the strategic …rms of a certain country are ‘cor-
related’ and ‘supported’ by some crucial sectors based in the same national
territory (Porter, 1990; Ergas, 1984). The same argument can be ‘scaled-
down’ at a local level when the national context appears so di¤erentiated
that it would be misleading to retain it exclusively at an aggregate level: in-
10For a review of the empirical contributions on this that has become known as the
‘Patel & Pavitt argument’, from the seminal work of Patel and Pavitt (1991), see OECD
(1992, Ch.10, p.225).
11In particular, such notions as knowledge spillovers, economies of integration, agglom-
eration and clustering, all concepts that presuppose a certain geographical proximity (es-
pecially when informal bits of information are concerned), have been argued to be as much
important as economies of scale in locating science and technology (Ja¤e, 1989; Ja¤e et
al., 1993; Feldman, 1993, Cantwell, 1991).
6
dustrial districts, technology pools, regional systems of innovations and other
similar local forums reveal …rst of all the innovation inducing e¤ects of phys-
ical proximity: the fact that this circumscribe the opportunities of sharing
a certain cultural and entrepreneurial climate instead pertains to techno-
nationality, and will be therefore discussed later (Brusco, 1982; Beccattini &
Rullani, 1996; Cooke et al., 1996)12.
2.2 Techno-sovereignty
Techno-sovereignty is apparently the most state-concerned component of the
taxonomy. Within the nationalism/globalism debate its relevance is twofold
as it regards, on the one hand, the balance between national, super-national
and sub-national public governance structures engaged in innovation; on the
other hand, the scope and the objectives of national and super-national S&T
policies.
The former argument is put forward by some international political scien-
tists, who claim that the dissolution of the nation-states into super-national
‘players’ would be an established global phenomenon13. That this hypoth-
esis should be retained very carefully when technology is concerned follows
from two quite simple and general considerations. On the one hand, inter-
national organizations with decisional power and responsibility for techno-
logical questions are often made up of central governments representatives
which inevitably express, more or less formally, national needs and interests:
accordingly, national innovative institutions do not simply fuse into inter-
national ones, and the latter, in turn, often contribute to di¤erentiate the
former in a co-evolutive process14. On the other hand, any attempt at harmo-
nizing the innovative institutional framework at international level, in terms
of standards, rules and norms, seems to accentuate, rather than smoothing,
the di¤erences between positions and arguments that are conveyed by central
12Within such a techno-territorial approach, national and local characterizations are not
necessarily contradictory. Although the dominant position in recognizing the relevance of
a Dahmenian/Schumpeterian mesoperspective claims a diminishing role of the national
context (Paquet, 1996; Storper, 1992, 1993), techno-territoriality helps to understand both
the ‘organization’ of the national context in di¤erent local environments, and the nation-
speci…c variety of their relative extension, dimension, internal and external relationships.
13See, for example, de la Mothe & Paquet (1996) and Ohmae (1990).
14Caracostas & Soete (1997) provide several examples of this kind of phenomenon at
European level and therefore opt for the signi…cative expression of ‘post-national’, rather
than super-national innovative institutions.
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governments15. Also the opposite interpretation of a ‘dispersive revolution’,
which would have dissolved national governance structures into sub-national
ones (de la Mothe & Paquet, 1994), should not be taken for granted in eval-
uating the actual scope of techno-sovereignty. In spite of the present boost
to federal systems (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Davidow & Malone, 1992), the
…nancial and administrative autonomy of the region-states and of other lo-
cal units in undertaking innovations remains a country-speci…c and country
dependent factor16.
Coming to the second techno-sovereignty issue, that of S&T policies, two
distinct questions should be considered within it. The former refers to the
scope that techno-globalism leaves to national S&T policies, the latter con-
cerns the role of S&T policies in facing some undesirable implications of
techno-globalism. These two aspects are strictly interdependent: the same
international pressures that make it increasingly complex to identify inde-
pendent national objectives, have also made national policies increasingly
necessary for adapting to the resulting new world order17.
At the outset it should be observed that, although the recent wave of
international integration has enlarged the ‘constraint set’ of the policy mak-
ers, the ensuing global (or rather super-national) agreements are not perfect
substitutes for national policies. On the contrary, national S&T policies
play an important role of co-ordination and often also …ll the gaps left by
super-national arrangements: in some areas multilateral interventions are
less justi…ed than unilateral ones, while in some others they reveal ine¤ec-
tive, as they are not co-ordinated with auxiliary national policies, or even
ine¢cient, as they inaccurately target speci…c areas where e¤ort duplications
with national actors easily occur18. National S&T policies are also more sub-
15The case of quality standards is a signi…cative example in this last respect (Barker,
1994). The argument is much more apparent when innovative statistics are considered:
particularly explicative is the case of innovations in services (Young, 1996).
16Cooke et al. (1996) qualify this autonomy as a necessary, although still not su¢-
cient condition for the existence of what they call ‘regional systems of innovation’. They
provide several examples in which a productive and innovative socio-cultural local base (re-
gionalism approach) is not assisted by the necessary institutional-infrastructural elements
(regionalisation approach).
17This phenomenon has been in general called the ‘contemporary paradox of national
policy making’ (Kozul-Wright, 1995, p.166).
18This is what emerges, for example, from a critical review carried out by Soete (1994)
about the di¤usion of innovation in SME in Europe: the creation of EC structural funds
without the parallel development of local capabilities, and the support guaranteed to pre-
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stantially ‘complementary’ to the internationalization process, as countries
need to constitute a sound ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989)
to bene…t from its potential positive e¤ects19.
The consideration of the global-e¤ects naturally leads to the second ar-
gument, that of the policies of ‘defensive’ nature: as globalization has stim-
ulated the creation of perpetuating, oligopolistic supply structures (Walsh,
1987; Cantwell, 1989; OECD, 1992, Ch.10), suitable national policies are
called for in order to face the upsurge of an unbalanced process of interna-
tional development. Although the question of their most suitable and actual
speci…cations is still open20, there seems to be a certain agreement on the fact
that national policies, and S&T policies in particular, should look for a sen-
sible form of ‘cohabitation’ with MNCs (Chesnais, 1992; Soete, 1994; Michie
& Smith, 1995). This does not simply mean picking-up and orienting locally
the right MNCs by providing them ad-hoc externalities (Dunning, 1991),
but rather relying on more substantial national interventions, for example
by strengthening the links between …nance and industry, or by upgrading
the domestic economic activity and its autonomous technological capacity
(Chesnais, 1992, pp.194-195): also in a ‘defensive’ kind of strategy, national
absorptive capacity questions are therefore of great relevance.
A …nal remark is due to about the relationship between techno-sovereignty
and the sector-speci…c characterisation of technology (Malerba & Orsenigo,
1995; Breschi & Malerba, 1997)21. Focusing on national technological capac-
ities would be therefore an imprecise policy perspective. It would instead be
more appropriate to refer to di¤erent sectoral ‘technology-support-systems’
(Metcalfe, 1995), as di¤erent technologies are promoted by di¤erent accu-
mulation systems, also across di¤erent countries, so that a super-national
perspective is simultaneously involved. The clash between the latter sectoral
competitive R&D within already integrated R&D systems are two areas where the need
of a complementary approach is pointed out.
19This idea of a national ‘absorptive capacity’ is discussed and illustrated through several
examples by Mowery & Oxley (1995), especially with respect to the massive wave of
technology transfers which characterize the globalization process and to countries at an
early stage of development (Dahlman & Brimble, 1990; Nelson, 1993).
20For an overview of the main positions see in particular Kozul-Wright (1995) and Panic
(1993).
21The underlying idea is that of ‘technological regime’, originally developed by Winter
(1984), according to which technologies di¤er in their opportunity and appropriability
conditions, and in the cumulativeness, nature and means of transmission of the relevant
knowledge. See also Nelson & Winter (1982).
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and supernational speci…cations, on the one hand, and the national one dis-
cussed above, on the other hand, is however only apparent, and it can be
solved when one only recognizes that technology policies can be addressed
to di¤erent issues (Metcalfe, 1995, p.38). In general terms, technology policy
can focus on technology as such, that is on the content of a certain inno-
vation, or on di¤erent stages of the innovation process, and in this latter
respect the ‘technology-support-system’ argument indeed holds. But tech-
nology policy can also focus on those institutions that develop and support
technology, and in this case the national speci…cation of techno-sovereignty
holds as well, possibly to the above mentioned arguments.
2.3 Techno-citizenship
Techno-citizenship is here meant broadly and refers to the actual degree of
accountability of the goals, strategies, and performances of the innovative
agents to those of the countries of their ‘formal belonging’22.
Although in principle relevant for all the organizations with a certain
degree of international openness, the question is particularly important in
dealing with MNCs, the most apparent example of an organization involved
in the economy and in the institutional setting of di¤erent countries. In this
last respect, the strategic relationships between the parent and the a¢liate
companies can be retained a proxy of the entailed techno-citizenship: the
role attributed to the di¤erent business units of a MNC, along with their re-
lationships, can be in fact maintained as the organisational acknowledgment
of the relevance of di¤erentiated national contexts in providing technological
and managerial resources and signi…cant innovation opportunities. Organi-
zation and management business studies with a global concern are therefore
extremely pertinent in disentangling the actual speci…cation of this techno-
component.
In the relevant literature23 at least three con…gurations have been iden-
ti…ed and applied to the analysis of ‘multinational’ technological activities
(Bartlett & Goshal, 1989; 1990). Given their implications for the present
22The citizenship of inventors and scientists, or the statutory reference of …rms and
other innovative organizations to their establishment locus, or again the juridical status of
their stakeholders, management or members, are not greatly a¤ected by globalization. For
this reason, rather than on formal citizenship the focus is on its di¤erent country-speci…c
characterizations, and on its di¤erent relationships with the correspondent nationality.
23For a critical survey see, for example, Grandinetti & Rullani (1996, Ch.4).
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issue it is useful to brie‡y restate their basic features.
In the …rst model (multidomestic model), the foreign activities are run
by independent …rms, to which the parent company decentralizes resources,
responsibilities and decisional power, relying on external controls rather than
on more integrated communicative forms. The inherent technological strat-
egy is local-for-local, as reactivity and ‡exibility to local instances are the
most important strategic competence: accordingly, those MNCs operating
with this model can be said to have a multiple and dispersed kind of techno-
citizenship.
In the second model (global model), the foreign activities are considered
as mere logistic appendices of the parent company, which retains central re-
sources and decisional power, and exerts a strict formal control over the a¢li-
ates. The typical strategy is centre-for-global, with the exploitation of global
economies of scale as the ideal strategic competence: the relative MNCs have
therefore a unique, central techno-citizenship, that of their base-country.
Finally, the third model (international model) is in fact a weaker version
of the second in which resources, responsibilities and decisional power are
transferred to the foreign activities to make of them ‘intelligent’ contribu-
tors to the learning capabilities of the centre, while the relative controls are
formally planned but less strict. Given the functional role of the a¢liates,
the matching strategy is local-for-global: however, the MNCs of this model
have a global, rather than a central citizenship, as both the a¢liates and
the parent company are equally important - although only through a uni-
directional centre-periphery transfer - for the entailed strategic competence,
that is developing a world-wide learning capacity.
Which of these and possibly other forms of techno-citizenship MNCs are
more prone to assume facing the recent techno-global wave is not yet an es-
tablished result. On the one hand, following those who have argued for the
current convergence towards an integrated international production system
(Doz, 1986; Dunning, 1992), the dominant speci…cation would be global24.
On the other hand, some other scholars (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990) claim that
more respondent to the new international order would be a further model,
which refers to more strategic competencies simultaneously, and with poses
greater emphasis on international learning capabilities. According to this
24The relevant model would therefore be one which determines a ‘co-ordinated fed-
eration’, rather than an extremely ‘decentralized federation’ or a ‘centralized control’
(Grandinetti & Rullani, 1996, Ch.4)
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fourth (transnational) model, the parent company does not centralize or de-
centralize once and for all, but rather diversi…es its conduct among the foreign
activities, integrating them in an internal network, characterised by di¤used
co-operative relationships. In turn, the selective di¤erentiation between the
business units depends only partially on the resources and competencies of
which they are provided within the network, but also, and especially, on the
national context where they operate, and on its role within the international
chain of value: in this respect, a further multiple speci…cation of techno-
citizenship, this time more genuinely national, rather than dispersed, would
be the most suitable to the present global scenario.
Although the last argument looks the most prominent, equally plausible
is the hypothesis according to which there wouldn’t be a unique, dominant
form of techno-citizenship, while all the above mentioned (and other) con-
…gurations would be potentially relevant and selected according to speci…c
considerations25.
These are the main elements of the argument with respect to MNCs.
Techno-citizenship has been much less debated in the case of national …rms,
governments and other public institutions (mainly universities and research
institutes) that, although retaining a national formal citizenship, are more
and more involved in international innovative partnerships, joint-ventures
and co-operative agreements. Although this kind of collaboration, aimed at
sharing and transferring know-how between national and foreign partners,
might be thought as functional to a knowledge augmenting, global strategy,
national references are apparent both in the public and in the business sphere.
As for the former case, although governments and public institutions are
usually deemed to be more prone to disclose their innovative results, it is
also true that they often ‘compete’ to achieve the leadership in some …elds
of science and technology, especially in those which have a strategic value26.
Moreover, in general terms, as these institutions are constituent parts of the
state apparatus, they are inevitably more accountable to their actual citizens
than …rms that are owned by a capital that is often internationally dispersed.
As for national …rms, and other non public organizations, the argument
of a multiple, national techno-citizenship holds again when the recent ten-
25In this direction moves, for example, that recent strand of empirical literature that tries
to link the MNC model of specializations with the comparative advantages of the home
and the foreign countries (Cantwell, 1993; 1995; Cantwell & Sanna-Randaccio, 1992).
26This is of course the case of knowledge and technologies with direct military applica-
tions (Pianta, 1988).
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dency of establishing co-operative, external networks is considered (Ghoshal
& Bartlett, 1990). In such cases, it is the identity of the partners, along
with the main determinants of the collaboration that provides some hints
to establish which form of techno-citizenship is the most consistent with the
present patterns of internationalization. In this respect, a recent body of re-
search on newly provided databases (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1990; 1993)
seems not to favour the hypothesis of global techno-citizenship (Archibugi &
Michie, 1995).
2.4 Techno-nationality
Following a broad interpretation, this component refers to the technological
relevance of the cohesion typically provided by a common nationality, but
also granted by other less formal and more peculiar sharing situations of the
same kind (communality of knowledge, culture and ideology) between the
innovative agents27.
Focusing on techno-economic aspects, at least two sets of issues fall under
the present heading.
First of all, as the kind of communality to which it refers gets forged and
evolves during quite long times, dealing with techno-nationality entails that
‘history matters’. Innovative processes and outcomes can be traced back
to the history of their main actors and institutions, inducing phenomena of
what has been called by technology historians ‘path-dependence’ and ‘lock-
inness’ (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985). Secondly, as the same kind of common
background is conducive of socio-economic relationships that are extremely
important for the innovative process, techno-nationality also refers to what
technology sociologists have called the ‘social-shaping of technology’ (Bijker
et al., 1987). In both these respects innovation comes to be interpreted
broadly, as a process that involve institutions that not only ‘do’, but also
‘support’ and ‘permit’ innovation, while the interactions among them are
as much important as their singular behaviour: in other words, in terms of
‘innovation-systems’.
As for the former techno-national aspect, that innovative systems estab-
lish and evolve under a contingent and local set of ‘techno-economic’ cir-
27The narrow interpretation that innovative agents of di¤erent formal nationalities re-
veal di¤erent technological capabilities entails a genetic, exogenous approach that has
been questioned in political sciences (see, for example, Mises, 1919) and that is not very
appropriate in any endogenous explanation of technological idiosyncrasies.
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cumstances is largely documented. In general terms, the constitution of the
modern nation-states, and in particular the solutions given to their external
and internal con‡icts, have spurred the perception of di¤erent national inno-
vative priorities. Also the implementation of speci…c innovative structures,
such as R&D departments, and the achievement of speci…c innovative perfor-
mances is strongly historically rooted28. To be sure, one has also to recognize
that history is made up of emulation (‘catching-up’) of other external con-
texts that are deemed superior, and of absolute and relative convergence
towards the world frontier29. However, even in those cases in which they re-
veal successful, such attempts usually call for a certain degree of adaptation
to …t a historically rooted national context (Abromovitz, 1989).
As for the latter aspect, that of the ‘social shaping of technology’, its
techno-national relevance is manifold as di¤erent are the variants it encom-
passes (Williams & Edge, 1996).
First of all, techno-nationality seems to show its natural, national spec-
i…cation when the reference is to the ‘social construction’ variant (Pinch &
Bijker, 1984; Bijker et al. 1987). The ‘relevant social groups’ of potential
users (Pinch & Bijker, 1984, p.414) that, according to this strand of litera-
ture, shape fundamentally the choice of a certain technological con…guration,
among a set of alternatives, are …rst of all located in a historically formed
context which models their interrelationships with the technologies they face
(Russel, 1986, p.334-335): in other words, the social-milieu of those groups
which close situations of ‘interpretative ‡exibility’ has also a national con…g-
uration.
A di¤erent speci…cation seems instead to …t the ‘labour process’ variant
of the social shaping literature. This approach focuses on the relationships
and power structures that characterise di¤erent industrial organizations and
investigates their in‡uence in stimulating or hampering evolving productive
technologies (Braverman, 1974; Wood, 1982). As strictly organisational ques-
tions, such as, for example, the technological performances of the ‘capitalistic
workplace’, are mainly considered, (techno) national elements are not main-
tained to convey signi…cant elements of di¤erentiation.
28For an extended discussion of these nation speci…c technological histories see the clas-
sical book of Landes (1969) and Part I of the most recent edition of Freeman & Soete
(1997). For more speci…c cases, see also Freeman (1987; 1992; 1995).
29Several examples of national institutional convergence are provided in Nelson (1993).
See in particular the discussion of the catch-up of the United States and Germany with
respect to the United Kingdom (Walker, 1993).
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The social shaping of technology reveals a more direct connection with
techno-nationality in a third, wider variant that explicitly considers the
broader institutional context that characterizes a ‘society’s technology en-
semble’ (Russel and Williams, 1988, p.11)30. Several aspects are addressed
within this strand, and at least three are worthwhile mentioning in their
techno-national speci…cations: the intrinsic shaping function of institutions;
their cognitive role; and the institutional nature of the market.
The …rst point is a typical argument of the institutional theory31, accord-
ing to which institutions and organizations, in particular those involved in
innovation, have two peculiar features: on the one hand, they do not rise
in a vacuum, being shaped by the presence of a cultural, possibly national,
environment (North, 1990); on the other hand, they do not reduce to con-
straints, but are also enablers, as they mould the preferences and the choice
set of the economic (innovative) agents (Edquist & Johnson, 1997). These
arguments have recently inspired the debate on the existence of di¤erent
models of capitalism (Albert, 1991; Dore, 1992), a great part of which is de-
voted to their technological implications, as revealed by the idea of di¤erent
national systems of innovation, discussed later32.
As for the second point, recognizing that institutions have a cognitive
dimension is also related to the cultural homogeneity caught by techno-
nationality. The basic argument is quite simple: given that information col-
lecting and elaborating abilities are limited, individuals (and more innovators-
entrepreneurs) must resort in their perception and processing activities to
established cognitive frameworks (Hodgson, 1988, p.119). As they are learnt
and acquired from speci…c social surroundings and national cultures, these
30The reference is here to those scholars who adopted such a broad perspective in dealing
with technology policy issues and to those who adhered to the recent neo-Schumpeterian
and evolutionary approach to innovation.
31More precisely, the reference is here to those contributions which are inspired by
the ‘old’, ‘Veblenian’, rather than by the ‘new’, ‘Williamsonian’ institutionalism. For a
detailed discussion of this issue see Hodgson (1988, 1993).
32The core hypothesis of this debate is that the advent of capitalism in culturally dif-
ferentiated contexts would have implied di¤erent speci…cations of a set of fundamental
socio-economic values and ideologies (such as, for example, solidarity, participation, short-
termism, speculation, etc.); the latter, in turn, would have shaped the internal organiza-
tional styles, the external institutional connections, the objectives and the performances
of the relevant productive, …nancial, educational and also innovative organizations. For a
speci…c illustration of the technological implications of the debate see Leoncini & Montre-
sor (1998).
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cognitive frameworks end up to be highly di¤erentiated and induce also dif-
ferent cultural styles of technical problem solutions (Farmer & Matthews,
1991, p.108).
Finally, coming to the third point, considering the market as a social
institution, and not as an institution-free ‘state of the nature’ (Dosi, 1988;
Hodgson, 1988; Lowry, 1976), makes the economic shaping of technology one
of the relevant forms of social shaping. The idea here is that the dominating
set of formal and informal social rules a¤ects the economic calculus under-
taken in implementing any economic decision, and a fortiori, that related
to the introduction and di¤usion of an innovation. Although a cost-bene…t
analysis of particular design decisions and technical choices has to be under-
taken in all societies, the form taken by this reckoning is extremely variable,
mainly because of those kinds of socio-cultural and socio-political aspects
addressed by techno-nationality (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985, p.15).
3 Techno-nationalism and national systems
of innovation
The concept of ‘system of innovation’ has become quite standard in the eco-
nomics of technological change, as it is recognised that the innovative process
does not follow a ‘linear’, isolated path, but rather occurs within speci…c
institutional contexts of interactive relationships between di¤erent organiza-
tions (Edquist, 1997). Less clear is which is the most relevant speci…cation
of its boundaries: techno-globalism has put the national speci…cation, the
…rst to be proposed (Freeman, 1988; Nelson, 1988; Lundvall, 1988) under
discussion, and spurred other super-national and sub-national speci…cations
(Edquist, 1997a). The reference to the framework discussed above might be
of some help in clarifying this issue.
Although the concept of NSI has originated with an empirical concern33,
and lacks an unambiguous de…nition and a coherent general theory34, a
33This and other similar concepts refer to what has been called an ‘appreciative’ kind of
theorizing, distinct from a ‘formal’ one because of its empirical concern (Nelson & Winter,
1982).
34For a discussion of the origin of the notion see Freeman (1987, 1988, 1995). For an
analysis of its several variants see McKelvey (1991) and Humbert (1994). For a wide set of
empirical applications of the same concept see Nelson (1993) and Cohendet et al. (1992).
For some more recent developments see Patel & Pavitt (1994) and Edquist (1997).
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strictly theoretical treatment of the topic is provided within Part I of the
book edited by Lundvall (1992), to which it is convenient to refer also for a
discussion of its national domain.
First of all, the main distinction of the present paper is explicitly stated
among the premises: a national dimension, de…ned by ‘cultural, ethnical and
linguistic characteristics’ (i.e. techno-nationality), is actually opposed to an
ètatist-political one, de…ned by ‘one single geographical space controlled by
one central state authority’ (i.e. techno-territoriality and techno-sovereignty)
(Lundvall, 1992a, p.2). Although the latter is also discussed in several places
of the book, the dimension which receives more attention within the three
bits which constitute the theoretical foundation of the notion (correspondent
to Chapters 2, 3 and 4) is for sure the former.
The …rst bit of the NSI theoretical construction recognizes two basic facts
discussed above (Johnson, 1992). On the one hand, institutions shape inno-
vation by allowing those forms of human interaction on which learning (by-
interacting) is mainly based35. On the other hand, the prevailing economic
structure and productive relationships a¤ect that more ‘isolated’ learning
(by-doing or by-using) which emanates from routine activities. Both the in-
stitutional set-up and the production structure are in turn highly diversi…ed,
at di¤erent levels, and this explains di¤erent forms of learning and innova-
tion: their typical organizations have di¤erent internal structures (‘…rst order’
diversity), di¤erent routine generation and selection mechanisms (‘second or-
der diversity’), and, overall, operate within di¤erent nation speci…c forms of
cultures and ideologies:
As long as we can identify national cultures, we should expect na-
tional di¤erences in production and innovation. Culture makes
nations with the same kind of economic system [...] di¤erent from
each other, and cultural systems are governed by rules and rules
about rules, including rules for breaking and changing rules. [...]
Many of the rules supporting production di¤er between countries
and since communication within a common culture is easier than
between di¤erent cultures, we should expect the di¤erences be-
tween national cultures to have considerable staying power. Na-
tional ideologies may also be important. [...] (A) nation often has
35This holds to a di¤erent extent, depending on its goal orientation: in this respect
learning is actually di¤erent from searching and exploring.
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a rather stable, common ideology. [...] (T)here are ideological dif-
ferences between nations [...]. Such national ideologies in‡uence
communication, interaction and learning at all levels of society.
(Johnson, 1992, p.39, original emphasis).
The second bit of the NSI theoretical foundation follows up the previous
one and deals more speci…cally with innovative user-producer relationships
(Lundvall, 1992b). The issue is deemed crucial as innovations, speci…cally
product innovations, entail such a degree of uncertainty and of asymmetric
information between producers and users to call for organised markets, in
turn relying on durable and selective relationships between professional in-
novative units36. These organised markets are (techno) national at least in
two respects.
First of all, techno-nationality is regarded as an essential producer-user
distance, as the cultural space becomes progressively more important with
respect to others (i.e. economic, organisational and geographical) in moving
from a quite stationary to a highly innovative environment37.
Complex and ever changing messages, combining explicit infor-
mation with tacit assumptions regarding mutual obligations, will
often be required in interactions involving innovative activities.
Here cultural di¤erences between user and producer may block
the interaction.
This is one reason why nations still play an important role, as
economic entities, with a relative autonomy. (Lundvall, 1992b,
p.56) .
A second techno-national argument follows from the theoretical assump-
tion that user-production interactions within organised markets can’t occur
between fully ‘opportunistic’ agents (Williamson, 1975), as this would other-
wise rise prohibitive transaction costs inducing complete vertical integration.
User-producer relationships are instead often inspired by co-operation and
36Organized markets are considered intermediate between pure markets and vertically
integrated relationships, conducive of, respectively, stationary technology (or at best
process innovations), and radical change (or even technological revolutions).
37These di¤erent kinds of distance a¤ect the character of the resulting technological
change, on a scale that ranges from stationary technology to technological revolutions,
passing through incremental and radical innovations (Freeman & Perez, 1988).
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other social agreements and values (such as, for example, loyalty, mutual
trust, respect, etc.) which are di¤erent among nations, inducing di¤erent
forms of cultural based ‘rationality’ (Kornai, 1971; Allen, 1988; Lester &
Crocker, 1987). This is, in turn, responsible for a di¤erent impact of the
transaction costs sustained in innovating and for a more or less developed
learning capability:
There are several (other) documented, interesting, international
di¤erences between agents which are rooted in national social
norms and culture. The time horizon might be short or long term,
and their attention might be directed towards either …nancial
variables or use-value aspects of production. [...] In the real
world, the dominance of either honesty or opportunism at the
national level will re‡ect historical, and perhaps even an heritage
from pre-capitalist developments. (Lundvall, 1992b, p. 61-62)38.
The last bit of the NSI theoretical construction speci…cally refers to the
structure of production and of productive linkages (Andersen, 1992) in af-
fecting both unintentional and deliberate innovative activities. Also here
national speci…cations are extremely relevant, with a meaning that keeps
referring to techno-nationality both with respect to simple (by-doing and
by-using) and interacting learning.
First of all, simple learning takes place within a ‘search (and selection)
space’ (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p.229) that entails stochastic outcomes and
path-dependence for the involved …rms, as suggested by the evolutionary the-
ory, but whose ‘topology’ is also a¤ected by the relative aggregate production
structure, as from the classical Arrow argument. The synthesis of these two
approaches mainly explains sector-speci…c diversities among …rms which hold
across di¤erent countries. However, another kind of ‘localized’ learning and
‘lock-in-ness’ can be …gured out which is more related to techno-nationality:
By ‘localised’ we mean national and more or less industry-speci…c.
This kind of localised search may help to conserve national idio-
syncrasies in the pattern of specialisation. In this case we are
38The argument also holds when international user-producer relationships, involving
heterogeneous rationality speci…cations, are considered: a variety of solutions for some
important questions about techno-globalism (such as, for example, the role of MNCs, of
SMEs, of standardization, etc.) follow accordingly.
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not dealing with a global ’lock-in-ness’ into speci…c technology
(as discussed by David [...] and Arthur [...]) but with a lock-in
of national …rms/industries due to, for example asset speci…city
and the di¢culties of entering well-established industries where
an especially huge amount of tacit knowledge becomes a major
barrier to entry. (Andersen, 1992, p.80-81).
Secondly, national systems of production and techno-nationality inter-
twine also when production-dependent interactive learning is considered.
Following again a structuralist-evolutionary synthesis, seller-buyer relation-
ships are locked-in in ‡exible, footloose speci…cations only as long as prod-
ucts are fully standardized, while they shift to a more structural, informal
and information-intensive, typically techno-national interface when a ‘proto-
commodity’ is introduced and gradually transformed into a well de…ned ‘com-
modity’:
The relevance of intranational (and techno-national) relationships
in the early stages of the ‘commodi…cation’ process is therefore
at least threefold:
[...] (1) (S)emi-formal and informal information [...] transfer is
not as strongly …ltered and disturbed in intranational as in inter-
national channels. (2) [...] The creation of new channels of the
innovative type is easiest between members of a national produc-
tion system [...]. (3) [...] Di¤erences with respect to the character
and amount of national linkages between producers and lead-users
lead to di¤erences in the overall competitiveness of nations [...].
(Andersen, 1992, p.85)39.
From all these brie‡y sketched theoretical arguments40 it clearly turns out
that the national speci…cation of the national system of innovation is closely
related (as in the case of the production and productive linkages argument),
and sometimes even coincident (as in the case of institutional learning), with
that particular component that has been previously identi…ed with the term
of techno-nationality.
39The list is only a sub-sample of the original one compiled by Andersen, so that the
numeration has been …tted accordingly.
40Although the reference is to Lundvall’s user-producer approach, similar insights can
be also drawn from Nelson & Rosenberg (1993).
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On the other hand, this is also true for many pieces of empirical work
which try to disentangle the actual speci…cation of the main sub-systems
within a system of innovation: studies on management systems and work
organization principles, either arguing for the intra-…rm transposition of dif-
ferent national cultural values (Kogut, 1991; Hofstede, 1980), or for the glob-
alizing e¤ect of organisational learning (Johnson & Lundvall, 1992); stud-
ies on inter…rm networking, either pointing to di¤erent national industrial
structures (Hakansson, 1989), or recognizing their regional structure (Br-
usco, 1982; Russo, 1985); studies on …nancial systems, either stressing di¤er-
ent socio-cultural styles of innovation …nancing (Tylecote & Demirag, 1991;
Zysman, 1983; Christensen, 1991), or suggesting the advent of a full …nan-
cial globalization (Franks & Mayer, 1990; Zysman, 1990); studies on pure
technological leadership and catching-up between nations, either highlight-
ing the role of nation-speci…c institutions (Freeman, 1992) social capabilities
(Abramovitz, 1989) and skills formation process (Ashton & Green, 1996, Ch.
5,6, and 7), or addressing the scope of globalizing technologies and worldwide
institutions41. Although more speci…c conclusions are obviously dependent
on the precise issue, in general terms the former techno-national option seems
to prevail on the latter techno-global one, so that it is plausible to conclude
that ‘techno-national systems of innovation’ still matter.
4 Conclusions
Extending the political sciences distinction between nation and state, in this
paper four dimensions have been identi…ed to deal with globalization in tech-
nology (i.e. techno-globalism): ‘techno-territoriality’, ‘techno-sovereignty’,
‘techno-citizenship’ and ‘techno-nationality’ as such.
By allocating the results of some representative contributions on technol-
ogy and globalization to the most pertinent heading of this taxonomy, and
trying to establish accordingly their global, national or sub-national speci…-
cation, interesting results have emerged.
41The above referred sub-systems are those discussed in the second part of Lundvall’s
book (1992, Part II: A Closer Look at National Systems of Innovation), with two notable
exceptions: the omission of Chapter 7, dealing with the pacer role of the public sector,
which better …ts the techno-sovereignty component; the inclusion of the educational and
training sub-system, highly shaped by techno-national considerations and not included in
Lundvall (1992) for scope constraints.
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First of all, apart from techno-nationality, all the elements of the tax-
onomy do not admit a unique speci…cation. As for techno-territoriality, the
need of a certain geographical proximity, and thus the relevance of a ‘local’
speci…cation (either national or sub-national), is the more plausible, the more
crucial is the role of tacit and implicit knowledge, while the same component
has a global speci…cation in ‘multinational’ contexts, where explicit knowl-
edge dominates. As for techno-sovereignty, national speci…cations dominate
in those sectors that are more related to the security, to the competitive-
ness, and to the technological idiosyncrasies of one country, while global
speci…cations are not purely substitutive for the national, but leave to na-
tional governmental structures the scope for supporting and accommodating
their implementation. Finally, in dealing with techno-citizenship, global (or
central) and dispersed (or local) speci…cations are two opposite, extreme
strategies which …t a scenario where production is the most internationally
integrated economic activity. A national speci…cation however prevails once
one recognizes the present dominance of an international division of the ‘cog-
nitive’ work within which the international chain of knowledge is the main
strategic rational.
Quite di¤erent conclusions hold for techno-nationality, whose ‘natural’,
national speci…cation is con…rmed by looking at several aspects: the role of
history and of institutional shaping in forming di¤erent innovation systems,
the national underpinning of the social construction of technology, the cul-
tural base of the cognitive role of institutions, and the institutional nature
of the market. Indeed, this is the unique component of the taxonomy whose
speci…cation is quite unambiguous.
In trying to determine which of the identi…ed techno-components is the
most implicit in the notion of national system of innovation, techno-nationalism
has emerged as another important element, along with techno-sovereignty:
such questions as institutional learning, innovative producer-user relation-
ships and productive (linkages) structure, that is the three interrelated build-
ing blocks of the most articulated theoretical construction of the concept
(Freeman, 1994), along with several related pieces of empirical evidence,
actually convey di¤erent elements of techno-nationality, either directly or
indirectly.
22
References
[1] Abramovitz, M. (1989), Thinking about growth, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[2] Albert, M. (1991), Capitalisme contre capitalisme, Paris, Editions du
Seuil.
[3] Allen, P. (1988), Evolution, innovation and economics, in Dosi, G. et
al. (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London, Pinter
Publishers, pp. 95-119.
[4] Andersen, E.S. (1992) Approaching national systems of innovation, in
Lundvall, B.A. (ed.), National Systems of Innovation. Towards a The-
ory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London, Pinter Publishers,
pp. 68-92.
[5] Archibugi, D. & Michie, J. (1995), The globalisation of technology: a
new taxonomy, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 19, pp. 121-140.
[6] Archibugi, D. & Michie, J. (1997), Technological globalisation and
national systems of innovation: an introduction, in Archibugi, D.
& Michie, J. (eds.), Technology, Globalisation and Economics, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-23.
[7] Arthur, B.W. (1989), Competing technologies, increasing returns, and
lock-in by historical events, Economic Journal, vol.99, pp. 116-131.
[8] Ashton, D. & Green, F. (1996), Education, Training and the Global
Economy, Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
[9] Barker, B. (ed.), Quality Promotion in Europe, Aldershot, Gower Pub-
lishing.
[10] Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, S. (1989), Managing across Borders: The
Transnational Solution, Boston, Harvard Business School.
[11] Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, S. (1990), Managing Innovation in Transna-
tional Corporations, in Bartlett, C.A., Doz, Y. & Hedlund, G. (eds.),
Managing the Global Firm, London, Routledge, pp. 215-55.
23
[12] Beccattini, G. & Rullani, E. (1996), Local systems and global connec-
tions: the role of knowledge, in Cossentino, F., Pyke, F, & Sengen-
berger, W. (eds.), Local and Regional Response to Global Pressure:
the Case of Italy and its Industrial Districts, Geneva, International
Institute for Labour Studies, pp. 159-174.
[13] Berger, S. & Dore, R. (eds.) (1996), National Diversity and Global
Capitalism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
[14] Bijker, W., Hughes, T. & Pinch, T. (eds.) (1987), The Social Con-
struction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology
and History of Technology, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
[15] Bijker, W. & Law, J. (eds.) (1992), Shaping Technology/Building Soci-
ety: Studies in Socio-technical Change, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press.
[16] Boyer, R. & Drache, D. (eds.) (1996), State Against Markets: the
Limits of Globalization, London, Routledge.
[17] Braverman, H. (1974), Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation
of Work in the Twentieth Century, New York, Monthly Review Press.
[18] Breschi, S. e Malerba, F. (1997), Sectoral innovation systems: techno-
logical regimes, Schumpeterian dynamics, and spatial boundaries, in
Edquist, C. (eds.), Systems of Innovation. Technologies, Institutions
and Organisations, London, Pinter Publishers, pp.130-156.
[19] Brusco, S. (1982), The Emilian model: productive decentralisation and
social integration, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.6, pp.167-184.
[20] Cantwell, J.A. (1989), Technological Innovation and Multinational Cor-
porations, Oxford, Blackwell.
[21] Cantwell, J.A. (1991), The international agglomeration of R&D, in
Casson, M.C. (ed.), Global Research Strategy and International Com-
petitiveness, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 104-132.
[22] Cantwell, J.A. (1993), Corporate technological specialisation in inter-
national industries, in Casson, M.C. & Creedy, J. (eds.), Industrial
Concentration and Economic Inequality, Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
24
[23] Cantwell, J.A. (1995), The globalisation of technology: what remains
of the product cycle model?, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 19,
pp. 155-174.
[24] Cantwell, J.A. & Sanna-Randaccio, F. (1992), Intra-industry direct in-
vestment in the European Community: oligopolistic rivarly and techno-
logical competition, in Cantwell, J.A. (ed.), Multinational Investment
in Modern Europe, Aldershot, Edarwd Elgar, pp. 71-106.
[25] Caracostas, P. & Soete, L. (1997), The building of cross-border institu-
tions in Europe: towards a European system of innovation, in Edquist,
C. (eds.), Systems of Innovation. Technologies, Institutions and Organ-
isations, London, Pinter Publishers, pp.395-419.
[26] Chesnais, F. (1988), Technical co-operation agreements between …rms,
STI Review, vol.4, pp. 51-119.
[27] Chesnais, F. (1992), National systems of innovation, foreign direct in-
vestment and the operations of multinational enterprises, in Lundvall,
B.A. (ed.), National Systems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Inno-
vation and Interactive Learning, London, Pinter Publishers, pp. 265-
295.
[28] Christensen, J. (1991), Financial systems, internationalization and cor-
porate …nance, Paper for the Conference on EC Business and Integra-
tion, Gilleleje 18-30 August.
[29] Cohen, W.M. & Levinthal, D.A. (1989), Innovation and learning: the
two faces of R&D, Economic Journal, vol.99, pp. 569-596.
[30] Cohendet, P., Llerena, P. & Sorge, A. (1992), Technological diversity
and coherence in Europe: an analytical overview, Revue d’Economie
Industrielle, n.59(1), pp. 9-26.
[31] Cooke, P., Gomez-Uranga, M. e Etxebarrria, G. (1997), Regional inno-
vation systems: institutional and organisational dimensions, Research
Policy, n.26, pp.475-491.
[32] Dahlman, C.J. & Brimble, P. (1990), Technology strategy and policy
for industrial competition: a case study in Thailand, World Bank In-
dustry and Energy Department Industry Series, Working Paper, n.24.
25
[33] David, P.A. (1985), Clio and the economics of QWERTY, American
Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings, vol.75, pp. 332-337.
[34] Davidow, W.H. & Malone, M.S. (1992), The Virtual Corporation, New
York, HarperBusiness.
[35] de la Mothe, J. & Paquet, G. (1994),The dispersive revolution, Opti-
mum, vol.25, pp. 42-48
[36] de la Mothe, J. & Paquet, G. (1996), In search of a new international
political economy, in de la Mothe, J. & Paquet, G. (eds.), Evolution-
ary Economics and the New International Political Economy, London,
Pinter, pp. 35-57.
[37] Dore, R. (1992), Japanese capitalism, Anglo-Saxon capitalism. How
will the Darwinian contest turn out?, Centre for Economic Perfor-
mance, Occasional paper, n.4..
[38] Dosi, G. (1988), Institutions and markets in a dynamic world, The
Manchester School, vol.56, pp. 119-146.
[39] Doz, Y. (1986), Strategic Management in Multinational Companies,
Oxford, Pergamon.
[40] Dunning, J.H. (1991), Governments, economic organisations and in-
ternational competitiveness, in Mattson, L.G. & Stymme, B. (eds.),
Corporate and Industry Startegies for Europe, Amsterdam, Elsevier
Science Publishers.
[41] Dunning, J.H. (1992), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Econ-
omy, Wokingham, Addison-Wesley.
[42] Edquist, C. (eds) (1997), Systems of Innovation. Technologies, Institu-
tions and Organisations, London, Pinter Publishers.
[43] Edquist, C. (1997a), Systems of innovation approaches - their emer-
gence and characteristics, in Edquist, C. (eds.), Systems of Innovation.
Technologies, Institutions and Organisations, London, Pinter Publish-
ers, pp.1-35.
26
[44] Edquist, C. e Johnson, B. (1997), Institutions and organisations in
systems of innovation, in Edquist, C. (eds.), Systems of Innovation.
Technologies, Institutions and Organisations, London, Pinter Publish-
ers, pp.41-63.
[45] Ergas, H. (1984), Why do some countries innovate more than others?,
Centre for European Polcy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, Working Paper
n.5.
[46] Farmer, M.K. & Matthews, M.L. (1991), Cultural di¤erences and sub-
jective rationality: where sociology connects with economics of tech-
nological choice, in Hodgson, G.M. & Screpanti, E. (eds.), Rethinking
Economics. Markets, Technology and Economic Evolution, Aldershot,
Edward Elgar, pp. 103-115.
[47] Feldman, M.P. (1993), An examination of the geography of innovation,
Industrial and Corporate Change, vol.2, 451-470.
[48] Franks, J. & Mayer, C. (1990), Capital markets and corporate con-
trol: a study of France, Germany and the UK, Economic Policy, n.10,
pp.189-231.
[49] Freeman, C. (1987), Technical Change and Economic Performance:
Lessons from Japan, London, Frances Pinter.
[50] Freeman, C. (1988), Japan: a new national system of innovation?, in
Dosi, G. et al. (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London,
Pinter Publishers, pp. 330-348.
[51] Freeman, C. (1992), Formal scienti…c and technical institutions in the
national system of innovation, in Lundvall, B.A. (ed.) National Sys-
tems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive
Learning, London, Pinter Publishers, pp. 169-187.
[52] Freeman, C. (1994), The economics of technical change, Cambridge
Journal of Economics, vol.18, pp. 463-514.
[53] Freeman, C. (1995), The ’National System of Innovation’ in historical
perspective, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 19, pp. 5-24.
27
[54] Freeman, C. & Perez, C. (1986), Business cycles, long waves, invest-
ment behaviour and technological changes, SPRU, mimeo.
[55] Freeman, C. & Soete, L. (1997), The Economics of Industrial Innova-
tion (III Ed.), London, Pinter.
[56] Goshal, S. & Bartlett, C.A. (1988), Creation, adoption and di¤usion
of innovations by subsidiaries of multinational corporations, Journal of
International Business Studies, vol. 19, pp. 365-388.
[57] Goshal, S. & Bartlett, C.A. (1990), The multinational corporation as
an interorganizational network, Academy of Management Review, vol.
15, pp. 603-625.
[58] Grandinetti, R. & Rullani, E. (1996), Impresa Transnazionale ed
Economia Globale, Rome, NIS.
[59] Hagedoorn, J. & Schakenraad, J. (1990), Inter-…rm partnerships and
co-operative strategies in core technologies, in Freeman, C. & Soete,
L. (eds.), New Explorations in the Economics of Technical Change,
London, Pinter, pp. 3-28.
[60] Hagedoorn, J. & Soete, L. (1991), The internationalisation of science
and technology policy: how do ’national’ systems cope? in Science
and Technology Policy Research, National Institute for Science and
Technology Policy, Tokyo, Mita Press.
[61] Hagedoorn, J. & Schakenraad, J. (1993), Strategic technology partner-
ing and internationl corporate strategies, in Hughes, K. (ed.), European
Competitiveness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 60-86.
[62] Hakansson, H. (1989), Corporate Technological Behaviour - Co-
operation and Networks, London, Routledge.
[63] Hatzichronoglou, T. (1996), Globalisation and competitiveness: rele-
vant indicators, STI Working Papers, 1996/5.
[64] Hodgson, G.M. (1988), Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a
Modern Institutional Economics, Cambridge, Polity Press.
[65] Hodgson, G.M. (1993), Institutional economics: surveying the ’old’ and
the ’new’, Metroeconomica, vol.44, pp. 1-28.
28
[66] Hofstede, G. (1980), Culture’s Consequences: International Di¤erences
in Work Related Values, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.
[67] Howells, J. & Wood, M. (1993), The Globalisation of Production and
Technology, London, Belhaven Press.
[68] Hughes, T.P. (1989), The evolution of large technological systems, in
Bijker, W., et al. (eds.) The Social Construction of Technological Sys-
tems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, Cam-
bridge, MA, MIT Press, pp. 51-82.
[69] Humbert, M. (1994), The globalisation of technology as a challenge for
a national innovation system, EAEPE Conference, Copenaghen, 28-30
Semptember.
[70] Ja¤e, A.B. (1989), Real e¤ects of academic research, American Eco-
nomic Review, vol.79, pp. 957-970.
[71] Ja¤e, A.B., Trajtenberg, M. & Henderson, R. (1993), Geographical
localization of knolwedge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.108, pp. 577-598.
[72] Johnson, B. (1992), Institutional learning, in Lundvall, B.A. (ed.), Na-
tional Systems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and In-
teractive Learning, London, Pinter Publishers, pp. 23-44.
[73] Johnson, B. & Lundvall, B.A. (1992), Closing the institutional gap?,
Reveu d’Economie Industrielle, n.59(1), pp. 111-123.
[74] Kogut, B. (1991), Country capabilties and the permeabiltiy of borders,
Strategic Management Journal, vol.12, pp. 33-47.
[75] Kogut, B. & Zander, U. (1993), Knowledge of the …rm and the evo-
lutionary theory of the multinational corporation, Journal of Interna-
tional Business Studies, n.4, pp. 625-646.
[76] Kornai, J. (1971), Anti-equilibrium, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
[77] Kozul-Wright, R. (1995), Transnational Corporations and the Nation
State, in Michie, J. & Smith, G.J. (eds.), Managing the Global Econ-
omy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 135-171.
29
[78] Krugman, P. (1991), Geography and Trade, Massachusetts, The MIT
University Press.
[79] Landes, D.S. (1969), The Unbound Prometheus. Technical Change and
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to Present, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
[80] Leoncini, R. & Montresor, S. (1998), Classifying technological systems:
an empirical application to 8 OECD countries, IDSE-CNR, Milan,
mimeo.
[81] Lester, R.K. & Crocker, M.B. (1987), The economic organisation of
nuclear plant projects: some cross-national comparisons, Centre for
Energy Policy Research, MIT.
[82] Loasby, B.J. (1998), Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution (forthcom-
ing).
[83] Lowry, S.T. (1976), Bargain and contract theory in law and economics,
Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.10, pp. 1-22.
[84] Lundval, B.A. (1988), Innovation as an interactive process: from user-
producer interaction to the national system of innovation, in Dosi, G.
et al. (eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London, Pinter
Publishers, pp. 349-369.
[85] Lundvall, B.A. (ed.), (1992), National Systems of Innovation. Towards
a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London, Pinter Pub-
lishers.
[86] Lundvall, B.A. (1992a), National systems of innovation: introduction,
in Lundvall, B.A. (ed.), National Systems of Innovation. Towards a
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London, Pinter Pub-
lishers, p. 1-19.
[87] Lundvall, B.A. (1992b), User-producer relationships, national systems
of innovation and internalisation, in Lundvall, B.A. (ed.) National Sys-
tems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive
Learning, London, Pinter Publishers, pp. 45-67.
30
[88] Lundvall, B.A. & Barras, S. (eds.) (1998), The Globalising Learning
Economy. Challenge for Innovation Policy (Report based on contribu-
tions from 7 projects under the TSER Programme), Brussels, DG XII.
[89] MacKenzie, D. & Wajcman, J. (eds.) (1985), The Social Shaping of
Technology, Milton Keynes, Open University Press.
[90] MacKenzie, D. & Spinardi, G. (1994), Tacit knowledge, weapons de-
sign, and the uninvention of nuclear weapons, mimeo.
[91] Malerba, F. & Orsenigo, L. (1995), Schumpeterian patterns of innova-
tion, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 19, pp. 47-65.
[92] McKelvey, M. (1991), How do national systems of innovation di¤er? A
critical analysis of Porter, Freeman, Lundvall and Nelson, in Hodgson,
G.M. & Screpanti, E. (eds.), Rethinking Economics. Markets, Technol-
ogy and Economic Evolution, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, pp.117-137.
[93] Metcalfe, J.S. (1995), Technology systems and technology policy in an
evolutionary framework, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.19, pp.
25-46.
[94] Michie, J. & Smith, G.J. (eds.), (1995), Managing the Global Economy,
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
[95] Mises, L. (1919), Nation, Staat und Wirtschaft. Beiträge zur Politik
und Geschichte der Zeit, Wien, Manzsche Verlags, translated as Stato,
Nazione ed Economia, (1994), Turin, Bollati Boringhieri.
[96] Molina, A. (1989), The Social Basis of the Microelectronics Revolution,
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.
[97] Movery, D.C. & Oxley, J.E. (1995), Inward technology transfer and
competitiveness: the role of national innovation systems, Cambridge
Journal of Economics, vol. 19, pp. 67-93.
[98] Nelson, R.R. (1988), Institutions supporting technical change in the
United States, in Dosi, G. et al. (eds.), Technical Change and Economic
Theory, London, Pinter Publishers, pp. 312-329.
[99] Nelson, R.R. (ed.) (1993), National Innovation Systems. A Compara-
tive Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
31
[100] Nelson, R. & Winter, S. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
[101] Nelson, R.R. e Rosenberg, N. (1993), Technical innovation and na-
tional systems in Nelson, R.R. (eds.) National Innovation Systems. A
Comparative Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.3-21.
[102] North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[103] OECD, (1992), Technology and the Economy. The Key Relationships,
Paris, OECD.
[104] Ohmae, K. (1990), The Borderless World: Management Lessons in the
New Logic of the Global Market Place, London, Collins.
[105] Osborne, D. & Gaebler, T. (1992), Reinventing Government, New York,
Addison-Wesley.
[106] Panic, M. (1993), The state as an agent of change, paper presented at
WIDER conference on the State and Economic Development, Univer-
sity of Cambridge.
[107] Paquet, G. (1996), Technonationalism
and meso innovation systems, PRIME,
http:/iir1.uwaterloo.ca/MOTW96/Summer96/GillesPaquet.html.,
pp. 1-13.
[108] Patel, P. (1995), Localised production of technology for global markets,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 19, pp. 141-153.
[109] Patel, P. & Pavitt, K. (1991), Large …rms in the production of the
world’s technology: an important case of ’non-globalisation’, Journal
of International Business Studies, vol. 22, pp. 1-21.
[110] Patel, P. & Pavitt, K. (1994), The nature and economic importance of
national innovations systems, STI Review, n.14, pp. 9-32.
[111] Pearce, R.D. (1989), The Internationalisation of Research and Devel-
opment by Multinational Enterprises, Houndmills, Macmillan.
32
[112] Pianta, M. (1988), Hight technology programmes: for the military or
for the economy?, Bullettin of Peace Proposals, n.1, pp.53-79.
[113] Pinch, T. & Bijker, W. (1984), The social construction of facts and
artefacts: or how the sociology of science and the sociology of tech-
nology might bene…t each other, Social Studies of Science, vol.14, pp.
399-441.
[114] Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London,
Macmillan.
[115] Russel, S. (1986), The social construction of artefacts: a response to
Pinch and Bijker, Social Studies of Science, vol.16, pp. 331-346.
[116] Russel, S. & Williams, R. (1988), Opening the black-box and closing
behind you: on micro-sociology in the social analysis of technology,
Edinburgh PICT, Working Paper No.3, Edinburgh University.
[117] Russo, M. (1985), Technical change and the industrial district: the role
of inter…rm relations in the growth and transformation of ceramic tile
production in Italy, Reserach Policy, vol.14, pp. 329-343.
[118] Soete, L. (1994), European Comparative Innovation Systems, pa-
per presented at the Transnational Institute on Innovation, Com-
petitiveness and Sustainability, Centre for Policy Reserach on Sci-
ence and Technology, Whistler, B.C., Simon Fraser University,
(http://edie.cprost.sfu.ca/summer/paper/luc-soete.html).
[119] Storper, M. (1992), The limits of globalization: technology districts
and international trade, Economic Geography, vol.61, pp. 260-282.
[120] Storper, M. (1993), Regional worlds of production: learning and inno-
vation in the technology districts of France, Italy and the USA, Re-
gional Studies, vol.27, pp. 433-455.
[121] Storper, M. (1997), The Regional World: Territorial Development in a
Global Economy, New York, Guilford.
[122] Strange, S. (1988), States and Markets, London, Pinter Publishers.
33
[123] Tylecote, A. & Demirag, I. (1991), Short-termism: culture and struc-
tures as factors in technological innovation, Research Project on Per-
formances Pressures and Technological Progress in British Industry,
mimeo.
[124] Walker, W. (1993), National innovation systems: Britain, in Nelson,
R.R. (eds.), National Innovation Systems. A Comparative Analysis,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 158-191.
[125] Walsh, V. (1987), Technology, competitiveness and the special prob-
lems of small countries, STI Review, vol.2, pp. 81-133.
[126] Winter, S.G. (1984) Schumpeterian competition in alternative tech-
nological regimes, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organizations,
vol.5, pp.287-320.
[127] Williams, R. & Edge, D. (1996), The social shaping of technology,
Research Policy, vol.25, pp. 865-899.
[128] Williamson, O.E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-
trust Implications, New York, The Free Press.
[129] Wood, S. (ed.) (1982), The Degradation of Work? Skill, Deskilling and
the Labour Process, London, Hutchinson.
[130] Young, A. (1996), Measuring R&D in the services, STI Working Papers,
No.1996/7, Paris, OECD.
[131] Zysman, J. (1983), Governments, Markets and Growth - Financial Sys-
tems and the Politics of Industrial Change, Oxford, Martin Robertson.
[132] Zysman, J. (1990), Trade, technology and national competition, Paper
for the OECD Conference, Paris, 24-27 June.
34
